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Abstract
This introduction to Historical Materialism’s mini-symposium on Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century places the three contributions by Husson, Mann and Roberts in the context of an exploration of the link between methodology and politics in Piketty’s economic history of inequality. Touching on the role of time and literature in Piketty’s argument, as well as on his difficulty in accounting for the relations of capital – especially ones originating in colonialism and empire – it approaches Piketty’s book, and its success, in terms of its concerted effort to produce a cognitive mapping of contemporary capitalism that can serve as a prelude to its democratic reform.
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The moment I was born I opened my eyes
I reached out for my credit card
I know I never did my own suit
Capital it fails us now come and let us seize the time
— Gang of Four, ‘Capital (It Fails Us Now)’

Ever since its staggering success became patent, Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century has prodded many a Marxist to muse about why such a scholarly panorama of contemporary political economy should prevail over its many historical-materialist rivals, especially those that have made intelligible the underlying dynamics of the ongoing crises of capitalism. This mini-symposium provides three incisive engagements with the promise and limitations of Piketty’s project; they draw out some of the key reasons behind Piketty’s rise as the most prominent Euro-Atlantic critic of the increasingly unequal landscape wrought by the ‘1%’. In Geoff Mann’s illuminating essay, we are shown how the anxieties thrown up by a predatory and disruptive capitalism among its critical but unconditional supporters have found in Capital in the Twenty-First Century an analogue of Keynes’s General Theory. Hence the immoderate praise from the likes of Paul Krugman and others who have been both galvanised and comforted by a critical prognosis of contemporary capitalism that joins scientific probity with an intra- rather than anti-systemic vision of economic and political reform. In Michel Husson’s and Michael Roberts’s complementary essays we are presented with sympathetic but exacting criticisms of the price paid for Piketty’s conception of capital – one that has been seen to invoke but also disavow Marx. Piketty’s Capital, in their view, never really removes the blinders of classical and neoclassical economics, falling short of a conception of capital as a social relation. This leads to both misunderstanding and neglect of the relationship between rising inequality and those contradictions of capital (above all, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall) that can allow us to seize the link between class domination, socio-economic change and crisis. 
	Since Mann’s, Husson’s and Roberts’s texts are both limpid and forceful, and the broad outlines of Piketty’s project unlikely to be unfamiliar to the reader over two years after its French publication – though it does hold the record for the most quickly abandoned book on Amazon Kindle!​[1]​ – in the remainder of this introduction I would like to provide some suggestions for how to bridge the question of method and explanation (the focus of Husson’s and Roberts’s critiques of Piketty’s political economy), on the one hand, and that of ideology and politics (Mann’s target), on the other, while also touching on some facets of Piketty’s Capital generally neglected in commentaries and reviews (literature and time). Piketty’s book, I will argue, is best understood as an effort to map our unequal present in terms both of its longue durée dynamics and of how the structure of these inequalities – the structure of a differential access to capital – could be made more or less transparent and politically acted upon. The main aim of his book would thus be the democratisation of knowledge about inequality, allowing us to put the politics of (re)distribution once again at the centre of the discursive arena. Piketty’s notion of capital allows him to order his data and prediction along an axis of centuries, but it also informs a conception of reform that can appear, from a Marxian angle, to address global injustice while bracketing out social relations. It is the link between the diachronic axis (the history of inequality) and the synchronic one (the making visible of inequality through taxation) which is at the crux of Piketty’s narrative, or, if you will, his proposal of a cognitive mapping of contemporary capitalism which tries to reboot the imaginary of reform. 


Questions of Method

As Knox Peden has incisively argued, like other longue durée histories Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century ‘forces the abstractions of history into explicitness’, meaning that it also permits us to see these abstractions – and the concept of capital in particular – as ‘figures of political investment and interpretation’.​[2]​ Peden also brings to our attention the profound fit between Piketty’s abstractions and his method, especially in terms of those very tax records whose production in the wake of the French Revolution so informs Piketty’s own Republican political imaginary. The hypothesis that inequality is a matter of income/capital ratios is both a product of and an explanation of Piketty’s sources and data – and, as his proposal for a global tax on capital suggests, his politics: what has been attacked as his utopian proposal is also the repetition, on a global scale, of that revolutionary gesture. The peculiarity of Piketty’s use of economic abstractions, and ‘capital’ above all, is that it allows him to homogenise data across different societies and indeed modes of production, while being formal enough to let him foreground historical contingency (and thus the possibility of reformist interventions). 
	Thus, we are introduced to a concept of capital which is capacious enough to span prehistoric tools and financial derivatives alike, but most importantly to bridge any caesura between capitalist and pre-capitalist societies:

In all civilizations, capital fulfills two economic functions: first, it provides housing (more precisely, capital produces ‘housing services’, whose value is measured by the equivalent rental value of dwellings, defined as the increment of well-being due to sleeping and living under a roof rather than outside), and second, it serves as a factor of production in producing other goods and services (in processes of production that may require land, tools, buildings, offices, machinery, infrastructure, patents, etc.). Historically, the earliest forms of capital accumulation [my emphasis – AT] involved both tools and improvements to land (fencing, irrigation, drainage, etc.) and rudimentary dwellings (caves, tents, huts, etc.). Increasingly sophisticated forms of industrial and business capital came later, as did constantly improved forms of housing.​[3]​

‘Capital’ is here analytically disjoined from capitalism’s historically determinate social abstractions: money, abstract labour, the separation of a proletariat from its means of subsistence. It is an essentially transhistorical concept.​[4]​ Yet we are also reminded, over and again, that the history of inequality is ‘a chaotic political history’, open to intervention.​[5]​ Though Piketty claims that the concept of capital mutates with social conditions, his own concept is not historically determinate; it is not a social form, but an accounting measure. Since the concept of capital does not itself explain, but only schematises and describes, the history of inequality, Capital in the Twenty-First Century can appear to some as a naturalisation of socio-economic tendencies but can also be presented by its author as a potent argument for the potentially critical role of political action.
	Piketty anchors the beginning of his narrative of inequality in contemporary class struggles at their most intense – in the shooting of South African striking miners at Marikana, perceived in its resonance with the Haymarket massacre.​[6]​ Yet his conception of capital and his prescriptions for reform – his economics and his politics – are articulated, like his data, around the nation-state. The choice of sources and data, along with his conceptual apparatus, condition a pattern of visibility and invisibility. Unchecked, a method turns into a social ontology and explanatory framework. The accounting unit of households sheds light on the vicissitudes of patrimonial capital but neglects the significance of corporate forms of ownership,​[7]​ the attention to the politics of income-brackets (of ‘centiles’) both grounds and nuances the contemporary animus against the 1% while draining class of historical and collective agency. When class finally does appear in the book as an explanatory category, it does so in a distinctly nominalist way.​[8]​ The gendered character of inequality takes even longer to get a peek in, and does not substantially impact the argument.​[9]​
	No doubt, Piketty would retort by stressing his contention that ‘social inequality is multi-dimensional, like political conflict’, that social hierarchies are ‘composite’.​[10]​ But the production and reproduction of inequality in the absence of exploitation is mystified, especially when the interdependence of enrichment and immiseration is both writ large by Piketty and treated in an essentially distributional register. The resonance of Piketty’s book rests largely on the evidence it adduces for his contention that private wealth is based on public poverty,​[11]​ that we have witnessed a staggering transfer of wealth from the poorer 90% to the top 10%, yet none of this is brought back to the relationships of exploitation, expropriation and dispossession that ground the potentially catastrophic inequalities which preoccupy Piketty.​[12]​
	Most significant perhaps for a reckoning with the fate of accumulation in the twenty-first century is the methodological nationalism that underpins Piketty’s research; perhaps, as Yanis Varoufakis has suggested, the book should have been titled The Wealth of Nations in the Twenty-First Century.​[13]​ Combined with the reluctance to consider capital as a relation, this means that while Piketty is to be commended for noting the place of colonialism and imperialism in the history of inequality his means of integrating them into his narrative are inadequate. The desire to maintain a homogeneous set of indicators across momentous historical transformations means, for instance, that relations of colonial domination and dispossession are treated under the anodyne and misleading category of ‘net foreign capitals’ – as though Algeria or India in the nineteenth century were simply ‘foreign’ to the French and British empires.​[14]​ Though it can draw our attention to durable patterns in global political economy, this methodological anachronism has severe explanatory flaws, which prolong those of treating cave-dwellings and Palaeolithic instruments as ‘capital’. It impedes doing theoretical and historical justice to Piketty’s own recognition that during the age of empire ‘the rest of the world worked to increase the consumption of the colonial powers and at the same time became more and more indebted to those same powers’.​[15]​ Not only does imperialism – understood as a relation between oppressor and oppressed nations, which endures mutated after the end of formal colonisation – do a vanishing trick; the formation and recombination of the transnational capitalist classes that shape the global landscape of inequality are excluded from the frame. 
	Piketty’s preoccupation with how the past devours the future,​[16]​ to use his own striking formulation, is also undermined at critical points by the way in which his conceptualisation of capital renders invisible those forms of exploitation and domination that underlie and underwrite the seemingly non-coercive reproduction and intensification of income inequalities. Thus, while Piketty, unlike many mainstream economic historians, does acknowledge the realities of slavery and colonialism, he does not integrate them into his account, and this for similar methodological reasons as the ones that lead him to sideline class. The originary and ongoing forms of settler-colonial and racial dispossession that structure the US polity are thus scanted, sometimes in perplexing ways. As Darwin Bond-Graham has compelling argued, with reference to the place that difference in land values between Europe and North America plays in Piketty’s story:

The value of land in America was clearly not being determined by any market, at least not any market that wasn’t first set up and shaped from the very start by a racial regime that allowed for expropriation. Land values were being subsidized downward by forceful dispossession, and then again by racial and gendered laws that made owning land impossible to all but white men. … Any discussion of capitalism in early America that leaves out these fundamental facts is lacking in its ability to explain prices of assets like land, for if the land hadn’t been available for privatization in such quantities it would have been a very different story of economic development. If white Americans had not developed an ideology of racial supremacy that led them to eradicate entire nations of people, to round them up into prison camps, and steal their homelands for settlement and exploitation by mining and timber and plantation interests, the whole issue of inequality in America today would be entirely different.​[17]​

As Bond-Graham notes, the erasure of settler-colonial origins – present also in Piketty’s strangely discordant reference to the ‘egalitarian pioneer ideal’​[18]​ (of white democracy) – does not stretch to a blindness about slavery: Piketty quantifies and graphically presents the sizeable proportion of US capital made up by the ownership of black slaves. The abstraction of ‘capital’ is here even more problematic, not so much because it repeats the perception of the slave body as another asset which could be replaced with an equivalent value, but because it entirely neglects the specificity of slave labour, how ‘the property’ – to cite the title of the first chapter of C.L.R. James’s The Black Jacobins – could be both pillar and gravedigger of the slave order, itself a qualitatively and quantitatively integral part of nineteenth-century globalised capitalism. Here too capital, as a social form rather than a transhistorical quantity, is lost in translation, and we can gauge the considerable cost to be paid for making visible the patterns of inequality encapsulated in r > g – the superiority of the rate of return on capital over economic growth which in Piketty is the linchpin of accelerating inequalities.
	Piketty might have read more of Capital, Volume I than he wants to own up to, but we might suspect he did not reach Chapter 26, and that primitive accumulation accordingly remains a secret to him, if indeed he can argue – against all past and present evidence of the link between accumulation by dispossession, patrimonial capitalism and inequality – that his principal remedy, a progressive annual tax on capital, would make it possible ‘to avoid an endless inegalitarian spiral while preserving competition and incentives for new instances of primitive accumulation’.​[19]​


Narrating Capital: Literature and Time

Piketty’s book is admirably reflexive about its status as narrative, about its attempt to produce a cognitive mapping of inequality past and present. In this respect, his frequent reliance on literature is not simply illustrative but testifies to his sensitivity to what he regards as the massive transformations not just in the social-scientific,​[20]​ but in the social representation of inequality.​[21]​ The most effective and substantial of Piketty’s literary examples are the ones related to the structuring role of inequalities of income in the novels of the nineteenth century. The attention to the place of income from rents serves as a warning from the past, the outline of a pattern that appears to be making a powerful return; it is also the index of our historical difference, since the effects of inflation, financialisation and changes in the forms of ownership make it increasingly arduous to map personal inequality with the unequivocal thoroughness available to Balzac or Austen.​[22]​ We are impeded in our representations both by the neoliberal ideology of a society of home-owners – whose devastations are now visible from California to the Costa del Sol – and by the complex invisibility of contemporary property in capital, from the mathematical sophistication of collateralised debt obligations to the legal opacities of tax havens. The realist novels of the nineteenth century tell instead of a time when patrimony and annual rent were convertible quantities, when the threshold of wealth was a stable standard present in everyone’s mind, and when human fortunes were inexorably tied to inheritance – the pitiless axis around which their complex plotting ultimately revolves. Whence the critical place in Piketty’s own tale of Vautrin’s speech to Rastignac in Balzac’s Le père Goriot.​[23]​ This is the cynical but realist expression of the fact that in a society where the returns on patrimony durably outstrip economic growth, the limits to social advancement through the professions and individual enterprise are drastic and entirely predictable. Only marriage into inheritance can realise Rastignac’s ambitions. It is no surprise that the present validity of Vautrin’s grim wisdom should resonate so much with a US liberal public, still melancholically wedded to the horizon of meritocracy – a horizon that Piketty at once demolishes and reaffirms in different moments of his book. 
	The question of the role of colonialism in the history and structure of inequality is also approached through a literary lens, as Piketty turns to Austen to gauge the relative weight between income from rent on English rural properties and from Caribbean plantations. He writes:

Foreign possessions first became important in the period 1750–1800, as we know, for instance, from Sir Thomas’s investments in the West Indies in Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park. But the share of foreign assets remained modest: when Austen wrote her novel in 1812, they represented, as far as we can tell from the available sources, barely 10 percent of Britain’s national income, or one-thirtieth of the value of agricultural land (which amounted to more than three years of national income). Hence it comes as no surprise to discover that most of Austen’s characters lived on the rents from their rural properties.​[24]​

However, as the literary critic Franco Moretti – whose practice of ‘distant reading’ could be said to bear interesting analogies with Piketty’s – had to concede in his Atlas of the European Novel, spurred by Said’s Culture & Imperialism, even if the quantitative proportion of colonial (rather than ‘foreign’) profits that can be registered in Austen’s work is relatively low, this does not minimise the ideological and strategic significance of the plantation economy for the nineteenth-century landed classes.​[25]​ In literature as in political economy, accounting has its limitations in tracking relations of power and interdependence. 
	Since the suffocating of the present and future by the material weight of the past, in the form of patrimony, is so critical to Piketty, it is telling that one of his most effective literary references relates to the way in which literature, rather than accounting, may shed light on the violent origins of what appears to be legitimate wealth. Perhaps betraying his own communist family origins, Piketty turns to a now little-known novel of the Soviet twenties to channel his own moral protestations against capitalism (which sit awkwardly beside his claims to ‘love’ it):​[26]​

In the novel Ibiscus (1926), Alexei Tolstoy depicted the horrors of capitalism. In 1917, in St. Petersburg, the accountant Simon Novzorov bashes in the skull of an antique dealer who has offered him a job and steals a small fortune. The antique dealer had become rich by purchasing, at rock-bottom prices, the possessions of aristocrats fleeing the Revolution. Novzorov manages to multiply his initial capital by 10 in six months, thanks to the gambling den he sets up in Moscow with his new friend Ritechev. Novzorov is a nasty, petty parasite who embodies the idea that wealth and merit are totally unrelated: property sometimes begins with theft, and the arbitrary return on capital can easily perpetuate the initial crime.​[27]​

There is an intimation here, disavowed in Piketty’s handling of primitive accumulation, of capital’s relation to its bloody origins, but also of a temporality laden with guilt and consequences. Here we can recall the striking results of the study that Catherine Hall and her colleagues recently completed of the material legacies – the legacies in capital – of the compensations paid out to British slave-owners at the abolition of slavery; legacies of inherited ownership still discernible in the geography and assets of today’s capitalist class.​[28]​ Read through such a lens almost every one of Piketty’s graphs (many more of which can be found in the technical appendix usefully provided online) is an argument for the manner in which the past, if unchecked, will devour the present and void the future – a temporality which, though Piketty himself does not, could be connected to that of debt. 
	Piketty’s welcome attention to temporality is not just present in his responsiveness to a generational problematic that has become especially acute in advanced countries – in the unmaking of middle-class aspirations, barriers to climbing up on the ‘property ladder’, dependence on inherited family wealth, and so on​[29]​ – but also in his attention to how the longue durée, his preferred analytical terrain, is never experienced as such, but only through the prisms of shorter, and sometimes countervailing, temporalities. The ‘clash of temporalities’, as Piketty terms it, is of momentous social and cultural import, as he details in periodising wage rises and differentials in twentieth-century France. From that evidence he concludes that though long-term tendencies are certainly in effect: ‘Nevertheless, for workers who lived through these periods, the changes in the wage distribution made a deep impression. In particular, the issue of restoring the wage hierarchy in both the public and private sectors was one of the most important political, social, and economic issues of the postwar years.’​[30]​ This unresolved tension in Piketty, between the longue durée and the conjuncture, is arguably a productive one, echoing the efforts of Marxist or Marxisant periodisations to square the seemingly inexorable tendencies of capitalism with moments of political opening.​[31]​ It also allows us to grasp the interruptions of deeply embedded patterns of inequality as moments which, even if not the product of political will, can be politicised (and remembered) as such – just think of the abiding force of the New Deal or the ‘Spirit of ’45’ in the contemporary political imaginary, including Piketty’s own. Yet we must also note that this clash of temporalities is a rather static and somewhat anaemic one when compared to those theories of temporality which have recently tried to articulate how the different forms and moments of capital, in Marx’s sense, shape different ‘strata of time’.​[32]​


A Melancholy Voluntarism

At the political level Piketty’s narrative could be regarded as the analytically grounded apotheosis of that nostalgia for a postwar compact that bathes the parliamentary centre-left across Europe in social-democratic melancholy. Once capital as a category is sundered from capitalism, the span, lasting a mere generation, between the late forties and the early seventies, can even appear as a kind of unicum in human history, the only period when the living were better off than the dying, striking out as an entrepreneur a wiser choice than biding one’s time as a rentier. Though he does not entirely neglect the effects of class struggle and trade-union organisation on the shape of inequality, Piketty ultimately presents the economic and ideological shock of world war – massive devaluation and the threat of social chaos – as the crucial ingredient.​[33]​ Thus, though there is an optimistic message in reminding his Anglo-Saxon readers that the highest rates of confiscatory taxation were implemented by the postwar US and UK governments, there is also a tragic undercurrent of sorts in Piketty’s reckoning with what it took to dislodge structural tendencies towards accelerating inequality. It is this unstable conjunction of long-term tendencies, catastrophic events and political voluntarism that Piketty tries to juggle throughout Capital. 
	Though his accounting of the history of capital tends towards the grand and (twentieth-century exception aside) stable pattern, his conception of politics is deeply contingent. This stems from the belief, in his own words, that ‘the history of income and wealth is always deeply political, chaotic, and unpredictable’.​[34]​ The clash of temporalities is thus internal to Piketty’s own method and worldview, and to his sustained effort to think how one may salvage what he regards as the invention of the twentieth century, the patrimonial middle class, and the related meritocratic hiatus in which Vautrin’s speech no longer held true – a view that chimes with much of the nostalgic common-sense of the contemporary left intelligentsia. Piketty’s desire to regenerate a situation in which existing inequalities could be justified by their social benefit is no doubt the least attractive feature of his position for readers of this journal, who will probably be familiar with his contribution to Ségolène Royal’s failed electoral campaign and who might be wary of his recent meetings with the leaders of Podemos in Spain, who have taken him on as an informal economic advisor.​[35]​ Yet we should note that, in keeping with his Republican fidelities, for Piketty this is nothing but an aggiornamento of the key tenets of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. The epigram for the whole book is in fact taken from the first article of that founding document: ‘Social distinctions can be based only on common utility’.​[36]​ It is testament to the fortunes of what Stuart Hall once called the ‘great moving right show’ that holding fast to the inaugural tenets of bourgeois liberalism is increasingly putting Piketty on the ‘far’ left of the European political spectrum. His proposals for ‘fiscal revolution’​[37]​ having been ignored by Hollande​[38]​ – who spectacularly botched the introduction of high tax rates for the wealthy – it is increasingly evident that any space for an enlightened consigliere has vanished from the social-liberalism that in Europe continues to invoke its socialist or social-democratic origins. As capitalism increasingly appears unreformable, its managers repelling the most modest of attenuations, reformism is forced to take on an anti-systemic guise.
	Alongside Piketty’s views about the vanishing middle, more social-liberal than even social-democratic in tone, there are more intriguing features of Piketty’s reformism, above all his repeated assertion – including against communist philosophers!​[39]​ – that taxation is an exquisitely political and philosophical issue. It is in the pages where he considers both the history and prospects of fiscal policy that Piketty sounds more radical notes, promoting the kind of dissuasive or confiscatory levels of taxation that could end socially harmful and excessive incomes, and reminding us that the top federal rate of tax in the US between 1932 and 1980 averaged 81%.​[40]​ Piketty’s French Republican convictions are insistently present, especially in a conception of democratic revival that would see mechanisms to render inequalities of income thoroughly transparent the key to collective political action. 1789 teaches us that all political revolutions are also fiscal revolutions. 
	Yet his admittedly utopian proposal for a global progressive tax on capital is not a revolutionary but a cognitive tool, promising the possibility of mapping inequality, as a prelude to democratic political control over economic decisions. Here too there is a considerable tension between the potentially radical features of such a proposal – numerous are the commentators who have noted that the precondition for such fiscal reforms would indeed be revolutionary upheaval​[41]​ – and the rather lame (and patently contradictory) ends, as voiced by Piketty himself: ‘to ensure that the benefits of globalization are shared by everyone’.​[42]​ What is key, however, and what also explains in its own fashion Piketty’s remarkable success, is that the book is driven by an anxiety to represent contemporary capital such that we may act upon its distribution. The centrality of taxation lies in its promise, in Piketty’s eyes, to fuse intelligibility and action. What his fiscal proposals would do – indeed what they are meant to do as proposals whose implementation Piketty himself is hardly sanguine about – is allow people ‘to grasp their position in the contemporary hierarchy’,​[43]​ as he rather nicely puts it. Even a weak wealth tax would, according to Piketty, have this function of raising democratic transparency, thus making possible, one imagines, the ‘new forms of organization and ownership’ of a reformed capitalism that Piketty alludes to.​[44]​ 
	In keeping with his French Republican mindset, the national electorate appears to be the only form of political collectivity envisaged in Piketty’s desire for fiscal democratisation. He underestimates or neglects the extent to which the liberal-republican conception of a democratic people and the fiscal transparency he demands both involve what, to borrow from Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason, we could regard as a serial organisation of politics, or more simply an individualising or atomising one. Forms of collectivity along axes of class, gender, ‘race’ – the ones that continue to give flesh to democratic and emancipatory aspirations – are rendered invisible by Piketty’s methodology, which is itself undergirded by a liberal Republicanism whose melancholy radicalism is testament to the impossibility of maintaining the imaginary of meritocracy in a neoliberal age. And yet Piketty’s book also resonates, intentionally, with the promise carried by the discourse of the Occupy Wall Street movement, namely that the serial divisions of inequality could be transmuted into political ones. Piketty’s own views of the matter, which nicely synthesise the projected affinity between his method and his politics, are worth quoting at some length here:

Thus in every society, whether France in 1789 (when 1–2 percent of the population belonged to the aristocracy) or the United States in 2011 (when the Occupy Wall Street movement aimed its criticism at the richest 1 percent of the population), the top centile is a large enough group to exert a significant influence on both the social landscape and the political and economic order. This shows why deciles and centiles are so interesting to study. How could one hope to compare inequalities in societies as different as France in 1789 and the United States in 2011 other than by carefully examining deciles and centiles and estimating the shares of national wealth and income going to each? To be sure, this procedure will not allow us to eliminate every problem or settle every question, but at least it will allow us to say something – and that is far better than not being able to say anything at all. We can therefore try to determine whether ‘the 1 percent’ had more power under Louis XVI or under George Bush and Barack Obama. To return for a moment to the Occupy Wall Street movement, what it shows is that the use of a common terminology, and in particular the concept of the ‘top centile,’ though it may at first glance seem somewhat abstract, can be helpful in revealing the spectacular growth of inequality and may therefore serve as a useful tool for social interpretation and criticism. Even mass social movements can avail themselves of such a tool to develop unusual mobilizing themes, such as ‘We are the 99 percent!’ This might seem surprising at first sight, until we remember that the title of the famous pamphlet that Abbé Sieyès published in January 1789 was ‘What Is the Third Estate?’​[45]​

No doubt, the continuing Marxist uptake of Piketty’s work will require not just praising his data sets but putting them to work in terms of a different categorial and explanatory apparatus. But it will also require thinking further through the attractions of a ‘reformist hypothesis’ that seeks to give democratic substance to the lived experience, but also the measurement, of inequality. Finally, it will mean thinking systematically about the intersections and divergences between the politics of class and the politics of centiles, about the emergent and unprecedented forms that the struggles against the capitalist production and reproduction of inequality will take in the twenty-first century. 
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